In a post two days ago, Nate Silver did an excellent job laying out the consequences of not increasing the debt ceiling, but also explaining why the Republicans are bluffing when they say they won't vote to raise the debt limit. Interestingly, Nate says that McConnell in the Senate would like nothing better than to have the debt limit increase pass, but to have Dems be the only ones voting for it, that way the GOP can use it as an election issue (so they're not bluffing about voting against it, just bluffing about letting the debt ceiling increase fail).
Mr. McConnell is discouraging his colleagues from filibustering a vote to increase the federal debt limit because he knows that, if push came to shove, some of his colleagues would almost certainly have to vote yea. He’d rather it pass in a 51-vote environment, where all of the votes could come from Democrats, than in a 60-vote environment, where at least seven Republicans would have to agree to a cloture motion.
Although Mr. McConnell’s remarks were made privately, other prominent Republicans have said as much publicly (including Mr. Boehner, who has said that a failure to raise the debt limit would create a “financial disaster,” and the G.O.P.’s designated budget hawk, Paul Ryan, who has remarked that the debt ceiling must be raised and will be raised.)
That doesn’t sound like much of a negotiating position. How to reconcile it against comments from other Republicans, such as Eric Cantor, that the debt ceiling vote will provide Republicans with “leverage” to extract additional policy compromises from President Obama and the Democrats. The obvious answer is that Republicans are running a bluff.
If the Congress does not vote to increase the debt ceiling — a statutory provision that governs how many of its debts the Treasury is allowed to pay back (but not how many obligations the United States is allowed to incur in the first place) — then the Treasury will first undertake a series of what it terms “extraordinary actions” to buy time. The “extraordinary actions” are not actually all that extraordinary — at least some of them were undertaken prior to six of the seven debt ceiling votes between 1996 and 2007.
But once the Treasury exhausts this authority, the United States would default on its debt for the first time in its history, which could have consequences like the ones that Mr. Boehner has imagined: a severe global financial crisis (possibly larger in magnitude than the one the world began experiencing in 2007 and 2008), and a significant long-term increase in the United States’ borrowing costs, which could cost it its leadership position in the global economy. Another severe recession would probably be about the best-case scenario if that were to occur.
