I've mentioned before that I think most corporate media coverage of Iraq -- especially television news -- is superficial. But sometimes exceptional reporting shines through, and this Salon article is one of the best, most comprehensive pieces on Iraq I've read in months. Their coverage of Iraq is exceptional, and I would encourage becoming a subscriber, but if not, you just have to click through a quick ad. The article is lengthy, but the subject deserves it, and it's the first in a three-part series.
The article explicates some of the influence and organization of Islamist Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Militia, perhaps the most influential force in Baghdad and other major cities. The Mahdi Militia has established itself as kind of a mafia-meets-Hamas organization of violence combined with provision of social services. They have stepped into the power vacuum created by an ineffective government, but the group's goals of a fundamentalist Shia state are extremely troubling for Iraq's long-term political future.
A sample:
One of the most disturbing developments in Iraq is that some ordinary Sunnis now support such mass attacks on civilians. A 30-year-old engineer, Aymen al Salihee, from the Saydiyah neighborhood, whom I have known for more than a year, became increasingly religious after making the hajj to Mecca. In a confused phone conversation, he told me, "You know, Zarqawi was a good man because he protected Sunnis." Last year he had told me, "I hate the Shia. I hate them so much." When I asked what they had ever done to him, he said, "Nothing." The young man's hatred is categorical, beyond reason.The article also touches on the possibility of intra-Shia warfare, which, as I've previously mentioned, would be a disaster for Iraq and hugely dangerous for the Coalition. Iraq has got to get a functioning, nonsectarian force out in the streets of its major cities, especially Baghdad. Where's Sistani these days? And perhaps even more importantly, considering their massive Peshmerga army, what are the Kurds up to? How (or if) the government reacts to the recent spike in sectarian violence bears close observation.
Average Sunnis like Salihee give tacit support to the forces that target Shiites and Americans. Those forces consist of two distinct but increasingly indistinguishable groups: secular Baathists and fundamentalists. Ever since the fall of Baghdad, members of Saddam's brutal security apparatus, the Mukhabarat, have expanded their networks -- which were never really destroyed -- and formed alliances with the fundamentalist groups, who are in turn funded by religious zealots from countries like Saudi Arabia. The old, secular insurgency of former Iraqi army officers has to a large degree been overtaken by the religious fighters and their constant stream of funds from abroad.
