Read between the lines. The generals are responsible for letting Bush screw up the entire war effort. I've been writing this for years. Now we have active duty members saying the same. Bottom line: The author argues that Bush screwed up, and the generals didn't have the balls to call him on it. They sent their troops into battle unprepared and destined for failure.
From Armed Forces Journal (below are my titles, and then quotes from the article indented).
THE GENERALS REFUSED TO STAND UP TO BUSH
If the policymaker desires ends for which the means he provides are insufficient, the general is responsible for advising the statesman of this incongruence. The statesman must then scale back the ends of policy or mobilize popular passions to provide greater means. If the general remains silent while the statesman commits a nation to war with insufficient means, he shares culpability for the results....THE GENERALS LIED TO THE THE PUBLIC
America's generals have repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq.... America's generals did not provide Congress and the public with an accurate assessment of the conflict in Iraq....BUSH AND THE GENERALS DIDN'T SEND ENOUGH TROOPS TO IRAQ, AND THEY KNEW IT
After going into Iraq with too few troops and no coherent plan for postwar stabilization, America's general officer corps did not accurately portray the intensity of the insurgency to the American public. The Iraq Study Group concluded that "there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq." The ISG noted that "on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals."
The most fundamental military miscalculation in Iraq has been the failure to commit sufficient forces to provide security to Iraq's population. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) estimated in its 1998 war plan that 380,000 troops would be necessary for an invasion of Iraq. Using operations in Bosnia and Kosovo as a model for predicting troop requirements, one Army study estimated a need for 470,000 troops. Alone among America's generals, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki publicly stated that "several hundred thousand soldiers" would be necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. Prior to the war, President Bush promised to give field commanders everything necessary for victory. Privately, many senior general officers both active and retired expressed serious misgivings about the insufficiency of forces for Iraq. These leaders would later express their concerns in tell-all books such as "Fiasco" and "Cobra II." However, when the U.S. went to war in Iraq with less than half the strength required to win, these leaders did not make their objections public.TYING UP SO MUCH OF OUR MILITARY IN IRAQ PUTS AMERICA AT RISK
Given the lack of troop strength, not even the most brilliant general could have devised the ways necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. However, inept planning for postwar Iraq took the crisis caused by a lack of troops and quickly transformed it into a debacle.
Moreover, America's generals have not explained clearly the larger strategic risks of committing so large a portion of the nation's deployable land power to a single theater of operations.CONGRESS IS THE ONLY ONE WHO CAN SAVE US (I.E., NOT BUSH)
We still have time to select as our generals those who possess the intelligence to visualize future conflicts and the moral courage to advise civilian policymakers on the preparations needed for our security. The power and the responsibility to identify such generals lie with the U.S. Congress.
