Everyone paying any attention to Iraq knows that political solutions and compromises are more important than military force in the effort to stabilize the nation. While the insurgency began as a primarily anti-occupation movement, its motivations and goals increasingly reflect a feeling of Sunni disenfranchisement and marginalization.
One of the most significant issues fueling these feelings is the current makeup of the local governments. Iraq's provincial elections were held in January 2005, when most Sunnis boycotted. The national elections held in December of that year, in which Sunnis participated, essentially rectified the imbalance at the federal level, with parliament roughly reflecting population percentages.
Provincial elections were supposed to occur six months later. We're now at the 14 month mark with no local elections even scheduled. As a result, Shia politicians are running Sunni areas:
Sunni Arabs constitute at least 40% of Baghdad's population, but only one of the 51 members of the local provincial council is Sunni . . . Sunni Arabs are also underrepresented in Diyala province, northeast of the capital, where they are believed to make up 60% of the population but hold only about one-third of the provincial seats. In the disputed northern city of Kirkuk, capital of Al Tamim province, Sunni Arabs and Shiites constitute about 25% of the population but only 15% of the Kurdish-dominated provincial council.If we want to see a surge that actually has some beneficial effect, how about a surge toward local elections that would solve the problem of provincial governments being a daily reminder of Sunni political impotence? The ignorance of political realities -- with a corresponding (and compounding) focus on military action -- means Iraq will continue to deteriorate.
